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Who Is the ―Human‖ in Human Rights?  The 
Claims of Culture and Religion 
PETER G. DANCHIN* 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. 
—Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
 
Let me begin with a familiar line of critique in human rights 
discourse which proceeds broadly as follows.  Human rights, at least 
in the specific form they have assumed in modern international law, 
have tainted Western liberal origins; the West embodies a particular 
legal tradition premised on a stridently individualistic account of 
moral personality; and the ―universal‖ rights asserted by powerful 
states such as the United States are thus merely another form of 
Western imperialism universalizing the tenets of a distinct tradition 
or ―being illiberal about being liberal, forcing people to be free.‖1 
Such arguments challenging the claims to universality of inter-
national human rights law raise difficult questions.  They are 
questions, however, that urgently demand our intellectual and 
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wish to thank my colleagues Clinton Bamberger, Taunya Banks, Maxwell Chibundu, 
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1. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN 
LAW 266 (3d ed. 2007).  See also Bhikhu Parekh, The Cultural Particularity of Liberal 
Democracy, 40 POL. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 160 (1992). 
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practical engagement rather than arrogant dismissal.  David Kennedy, 
for example, points to the fact that the idea of human rights has a 
particular time and place of origin ―[p]ost-enlightenment, ration-
alist, secular, Western, modern, capitalist‖ and has therefore argued 
that, to the extent the international human rights project is linked to 
liberal Western ideas about the relationship among law, politics, and 
economics, it is itself ―part of the problem.‖2   
For Kennedy, the main difficulty is the way that human rights 
positions itself, in accordance with its rationalistic underpinnings, as 
an ―emancipatory political project‖ that operates outside politics.  
The implicit logic is that: 
emancipation means progress forward from the natural 
passions of politics into the civilized reason of law.  The 
urgent need to develop a more vigorous human politics is 
sidelined . . . . [and w]ork to develop law comes to be seen as 
an emancipatory end in itself, leaving the human rights 
movement too ready to articulate problems in political terms 
and solutions in legal terms.  Precisely the reverse would be 
more useful.3 
Similarly, for Martti Koskenniemi the paradox of international 
human rights law is that it ―aims to create space for a non-political 
normativity in the form of human rights that would be opposable to 
the politics of states but is undermined by the experience that what 
rights mean . . . and how they are applied, can only be determined by 
the politics of states.‖4  This is the basis for Koskenniemi‘s thesis of 
the interminable dialectic between the universal and the particular in 
international legal argument. 
I have titled my reflective essay ―Who is the ‗Human‘ in Human 
Rights?‖  By doing so, I wish to suggest that modern critiques, like 
those of Kennedy and Koskenniemi, force us to confront at least two 
conceptual puzzles in the field of human rights which go to the heart 
of issues so pressing and controversial today: the claims of culture 
and religion. 
 
2. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 114–15 (2002). 
3. Id. at 115. 
4. Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights, Politics, and Love, 13 FINNISH Y.B. INT‘L L. 79, 
79 (2002). 
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SECULAR FREEDOM AND THE CLAIMS OF RELIGION 
The first puzzle concerns the two concepts, often run together, of 
the secular (or secularism)5 and freedom, and the related question of 
how rights—e.g. the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion—mediate between these purportedly universal or objective 
positions and the imagined subjective claims of particular religious or 
cultural norms. 
Let me provide two contemporary examples. 
The wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public schools, and the 
rights of Muslim minorities in European nation-states more 
generally,6 have been subjects of acute and often angry debate in 
recent years.  In particular France, with its own unique conceptions of 
laicité and individual rights, has sought to restrict the wearing of 
religious symbols in parts of the public sphere on various grounds 
including those of public order, the rights and freedoms of others, and 
gender equality or the protection of women, especially girls, against 
discrimination. 
The other striking example of contestation and conflict within 
rights discourse has occurred in the context of the so-called 
Muhammad cartoons affair.  In September 2005, the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve editorial cartoons 
depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad, leading to widespread and 
violent protests both in Denmark and across the Islamic world. 
In the United States, the weight of legal opinion has favored free 
speech as against any countervailing right to freedom of religion, and 
has favored the individual right to expression as against any 
countervailing group or minority rights to be free from discrim-
ination, hostility or violence.  In Europe, however, there has generally 
 
5.  The notion of ―the secular‖ as an epistemic category and ―secularism‖ as a political 
doctrine is discussed in TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, 
MODERNITY 1 (2003).  Scholars such as T. N. Madan similarly distinguish between 
―secularization‖ as a socio-cultural process that enlarges the ―areas of life—material, 
institutional and intellectual—in which the role of the sacred is progressively limited;‖ 
―secularity‖ as the ―resultant state of social being;‖ and ―secularism‖ as an ideology that 
argues the ―historical inevitability and progressive nature of secularization everywhere.‖  T. 
N. MADAN, MODERN MYTHS, LOCKED MINDS: SECULARISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN INDIA 
5–6 (1997). 
6. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of 
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 367 (2007); Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism 
as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1 (2008). 
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been a greater sensitivity shown to these countervailing factors.  
European states have made a genuine (albeit inconclusive) attempt to 
reconcile the competing claims of right at issue in terms of both the 
historical context of European inter-group relations and the relevant 
international human rights instruments.   
By contrast, in the vast majority of Islamic states there has been a 
consensus that the cartoons are part of a wider pattern of 
discrimination and hostility towards Muslims in Europe in particular 
and are defamatory of Islam in general.  On the basis that defamation 
of religions is inconsistent with the right to freedom of expression, 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference has called for ―legally-
binding‖ U.N. resolutions to ―prevent defamation of religion and 
prophets‖ and to ―render all acts whatsoever defaming Islam as 
‗offensive acts‘ and subject to punishment.‖7 
I should make clear that the eclectic, value-pluralist nature of the 
European position is the approach I favor.  By considering both the 
individual and collective interests protected by the right to freedom 
of religion, we begin to see both the unarticulated major premises and 
particulars masquerading as universals in much Western rights 
discourse. 
But irrespective of how such a case is resolved in particular 
domestic legal systems, how should it be addressed as a matter of 
international human rights law?  Does the communicative act at issue 
here—or perhaps the failure of a state to prevent or punish such an 
act—violate human rights norms regarding freedom of religion and 
belief, or is it rather an act protected by rights such as freedom of 
expression and opinion?  Similarly, in the case of the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf, on what possible grounds may states limit the 
freedom to manifest one‘s religion or belief?  What, in particular, 
would we need to know in order to make such determinations, and 
why has there been such a wide divergence of views on these issues 
across the world? 
 
7. Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, 33d Sess., On Eliminating Hatred and 
Prejudice Against Islam, Res. No. 26/33-DW (June 19–21, 2006).  Note that fifty-seven 
member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have had longstanding 
concerns regarding ―defamation of religions.‖  The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has 
passed resolutions annually since 1999 on combating defamation of religions.  See U.N. 
Comm‘n on Hum. Rts., Combating Defamation of Religions, pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/ 
2005/3 (Apr. 12, 2005). 
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In the language of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, how 
should human beings ―born free and equal in dignity and rights. . . . 
endowed with the faculties of reason and conscience‖ and seeking to 
―act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood‖ resolve such 
seemingly intractable and historically and culturally situated con-
flicts?  How do we understand the relationship in Article 1 between 
the human as subject and the concepts of reason, conscience, and 
freedom?  Are ―conscience‖ and ―reason‖ perhaps the two ascending 
and descending argumentative positions8 captured in our singular 
notion of ―right‖—a notion which itself straddles between the Human 
and a transcendent or metaphysical notion of (universal) Liberty?  If 
so, how does this argumentative structure differ in fundamental terms 
from pre-classical international legal thought which was premised on 
similar notions of God or Nature? 
If the drafters of the Declaration—whether René Cassin, John 
Humphrey or the Harvard-educated Peng-chun Chang9—had an 
Enlightenment view of human rights as ―somehow located in human 
beings simply by virtue of their own humanity, and for no other 
extraneous reason, such as social conventions [whether religion, 
tradition, or custom], acts of governments, or decisions of par-
liaments or courts,‖10 what does this tell us today, sixty years later? 
Here I am alluding to Koskenniemi‘s point that, unlike lawyers 
such as Hersch Lauterpacht who wrote his 1950 monograph 
 
8. For the notion of ―ascending‖ and ―descending‖ strands of argument, see MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 45 (1989). 
9. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 281 (1999).  Note that there was great disagreement during the 
drafting of Article 1 between the delegates of different States over what Morsink terms the 
question of ―a single, transcendent source of value‖ leading to ―A Bargain about God and 
Nature,‖ id. at 283, which, according to Cassin, ―allowed the Committee to take no position 
on the nature of man and of society and to avoid metaphysical controversies, notably the 
conflicting doctrines of spiritualists, rationalists, and materialists regarding the origin of the 
rights of man,‖ id. at 287 (quoting René Cassin, Historique de la Déclaration Universelle de 
1948, in LA PENSÉE ET L‘ACTION 108 (1981)).  Lindholm has also observed that Article 1 in 
no way explains the source of these universal characteristics of human beings.  By omitting 
any reference to a Supreme Being or Nature as a source of inherent rights, and thus leaving 
open enough the space to allow for a multitude of interpretations, the drafters were able to 
create a document which could be accepted by the broad majority of peoples.  This, in turn, 
supports the view that Article 1 is not a mere reiteration of Western Natural Rights 
Philosophy.  Tore Lindholm, Article 1, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A COMMENTARY 31 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1992). 
10. MORSINK, supra note 9, at 281. 
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International Law and Human Rights in an effort to ―recapture the 
Western canon of individual rights as derived not only from 
Enlightenment thinkers but also from sixteenth-century religious 
humanism and even Stoic dogma,‖ 
we no longer take seriously the tradition within which human 
rights grew up but ‗have fragmented an older tradition by 
appropriating parts of it while leaving behind crucial premises 
that gave these parts their underlying coherence.‘  As a result, 
rights have become at best a sentimental memory of political 
faith that we no longer have—a love that we have lost—but 
cannot fit within the rituals of modern politics.  At worst, they 
have become a façade for cynicism, and an instrument of 
hegemony.11 
Without a universal foundation in ―human nature‖ or ―autonomous 
human reason,‖ the quest for an ultimate foundation for human rights 
is itself misconceived.  On this, many today agree.12  If rights cannot 
in fact be outside politics or ideology—if we now see them not as a 
condition or limit on politics in an objectively-ascertainable moral 
order but in fact as an effect or outcome of politics—what impli-
cations follow for our understanding of the legal content and 
institutional politics of human rights? 
For Koskenniemi, the answer is to realize that rights defer to 
politics in their practice and application in at least four ways: ―field 
 
11. Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 80–81 (footnotes omitted).  Koskenniemi suggests that 
the tradition Lauterpacht was seeking to invoke and revive in the aftermath of World War II 
and the Holocaust 
received the meaning of human rights sometimes from scripture, sometimes from a 
concept of uniform human nature, from a progressive philosophy of history or an 
autonomous concept of reason.  But today, naturalism, rationalism and religion have 
each become vulnerable to the hermeneutics of suspicion embedded in the same 
Enlightenment that gave us the notion of rights in the first place.  The moral 
grounding of rights that was central to Vitoria, Grotius or Locke is not available in a 
world where morality has turned into subjective, historically conditioned ‗value-
systems‘ and where anthropologies of humanity have produced both liberal and 
racist conclusions. 
Id. at 81. 
12. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations (Univ. of Oxford Faculty 
of Law, Working Paper No. 14/2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=999874 (advancing an antifoundational or ―political conception‖ of human 
rights); JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT‘S WAKE: POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
MODERN AGE 72 (1995) (arguing that rights claims are never foundational because ―human 
rights have neither substantive content nor moral weight until their impact on human 
interests, their contribution to human well-being, has been specified‖). 
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constitution‖ (the process by which different areas of social life come 
to be characterized in terms of rights); ―indeterminacy‖ (rights have 
no meaning independent of how they are interpreted by a relevant 
authority in a relevant context); ―right-exception‖ (rights always 
come with exceptions and the scope of the exceptions are determined 
by choices which ultimately rely on alternative conceptions of good 
society); and ―conflicts of rights‖ (in any conflict, the opposing sides 
will describe their claims in terms of rights).13 
None of this would have much surprised Max Horkheimer or 
Theodor Adorno writing their Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1947 at 
the exact moment the Declaration was being drafted and international 
lawyers such as Lauterpacht were decrying the sovereignty of the 
nation-state in the name of the ―sovereignty of man.‖  For Hork-
heimer and Adorno, the scientific method of the Enlightenment  
may have originally intended to serve the ideals of human 
liberation in an assault upon religious dogma.  Yet the power 
of scientific reason ultimately wound up being directed not 
merely against the gods, but all metaphysical ideas—including 
conscience and freedom—as well.  ‗Knowledge‘ became 
divorced from ‗information,‘ norms from facts, and the 
scientific method, increasingly freed from any commitment to 
liberation, transformed nature into an object of domination, 
and itself into a whore employed by the highest bidder.14 
In similarly controversial terms, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the 
Enlightenment project has failed in its objective to find a free-
standing rational justification of liberal political morality. 
On the one hand the individual moral agent, freed from 
hierarchy and teleology, conceives of himself and is conceived 
of by moral philosophers as sovereign in his moral authority.  
On the other hand the inherited, if partially transformed rules 
of morality have to be found some new status, deprived as they 
have been of their older teleological character and their even 
more ancient categorical character as expressions of an 
 
13. Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 82–85. 
14. Stephen Eric Bronner, Interpreting the Enlightenment: Metaphysics, Critique, and 
Politics, 3 LOGOS (2004), http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_3.3/bronner.htm.  Note also 
Gray‘s argument that the core of the Enlightenment was the ―displacement of local, 
customary or traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or 
rational morality, which was projected as the basis of a universal civilization.‖  GRAY, supra 
note 12, at 123. 
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ultimately divine law.15 
But did the drafters really hold to an essentialist view of the 
foundations of human rights?  Or rather, as Morsink has suggested, 
did they hold to non-essentialist, non-rationalist views of both the 
secular and freedom such that ―any criticism of the Enlightenment 
project, as then conceived, does not automatically doom the 
Universal Declaration‖?16 
Here it is helpful to recall Charles Taylor‘s distinction between the 
―common ground‖ and ―independent political ethic‖ strategies of 
seeking to justify a universal norm of religious freedom, and, in turn, 
the methodological implications of seeking to reconcile these two 
modes of justification. 
Each strategy offers different ways of conceptualizing the bases 
upon which people of different religious and fundamental commit-
ments seek to live together in a political community.  On the one 
hand, the common ground approach seeks convergence on certain 
norms by appealing to different comprehensive (religious or other) 
commitments.  On the other hand, the independent political ethic 
approach ―asks us to abstract from these deeper or higher beliefs 
altogether for purposes of political morality‖ in search of a common 
basis for peaceful and equitable coexistence. 
The important point to note is that neither strategy on its own can 
be successful because neither rests upon a firm foundation.  As 
Taylor notes, the main problem with the common ground approach is 
that in diverse societies with expanding religious and fundamental 
commitments, ―the ground originally defined as common becomes 
that of one party among others.‖17  Given that competing conceptions 
 
15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 60 (3d ed. 
2007).  For Gray, this collapse gives ―contemporary moral discourse its distinctive character 
of emotivism or subjectivism, in which moral judgments are in the end assimilated to 
preferences, and of deep incoherence.‖  GRAY, supra note 12, at 148.  It is merely the ―long 
shadow cast in the slow eclipse of Christian transcendental faith‖ with the result that we 
today live ―among the fragments of archaic moral vocabularies, whose undergirding 
structure of metaphysical and religious beliefs has long since collapsed.‖  Id. 
16. MORSINK, supra note 9, at 283.  Morsink suggests that they saw the two human 
capacities of reason and conscience as ―epistemic‖ vehicles by which we can come to know 
that people have human rights.  Id.  
17. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 35–36 (Rajeev 
Bhargava ed., 1998) (noting that while the Founders of the U.S. Constitution agreed on 
―some kind of Christian outlook‖ that could be ―pushed laterally into a vaguer biblical 
theism to accommodate Jews,‖ the U.S. ―now contains substantial numbers of non-believers, 
as well as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of many other views‖). 
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of the good themselves generate the Rawlsian overlapping consensus, 
that consensus is dynamic, intersubjective, and constantly shifting, 
and can thus have no single, stable foundation. 
Likewise, the ―very diversification that has undercut the common 
ground approach also challenges the independent ethic,‖ a process 
that becomes especially difficult as between believers of all faiths on 
the one hand and atheists on the other—who seek to ―police the 
boundary between independent and religious ethic more closely, and 
to . . . push further the process of making religion irrelevant in the 
public sphere.‖18 
Not only is the meaning of the right to religious freedom itself 
essentially contested between the religious and secular spheres, but 
also its relationship to other conceptions of rights (such as minority 
and self-determination norms) is equally contested.  For these and 
related reasons, the problem of rights foundationalism is irresolvable 
when both strategies are considered separately. 
Taylor suggests that these shortcomings become even more 
problematic when religious freedom is asserted as a right under 
international law.  Viewed from a non-Western perspective, both 
approaches appear inextricably linked to their Christian origins: the 
common ground to a form of post-Enlightenment Deism and the 
independent ethic to the rise of Western unbelief and secularism.  To 
the extent, then, that international human rights law is perceived as 
being grounded in either (or both) of these approaches, the dual 
charges of foreign and imperial imposition are likely to arise.  Indeed, 
perhaps somewhat ironically, this problem is likely to be more acute 
in the case of the independent ethic which, once unmoored from 
Western secularism and imported into comprehensively religious 
societies, ―understandably comes across as the imposition of one 
metaphysical view over others, and an alien one at that.‖19 
 
18. Id. at 36.  Taylor sees this as leading to a ―Kulturkampf, in which ‗secularists‘ slug it 
out with believers on issues about the fundamentals of their society.‖  Id.  To believers this 
may soon be perceived as the exclusion of religion in the name of a ―rival metaphysical 
belief.‖  Id.  The problem becomes further compounded when ―the society diversifies to 
contain substantial numbers of adherents of non-Judeo-Christian religions.  If even some 
Christians find the ‗post-Christian‘ independent ethic partisan, how much harder will 
Muslims find it to swallow it.‖  Id. at 36–37. 
19. Id. at 37.  Taylor suggests that in this form, ―Western secularism may not ‗travel‘ 
very well outside its heartland; or only in the form of an authoritarian programme designed 
to diminish the hold of religion on the masses, as in Turkey under Atatürk, or China under 
Mao.‖  Id. 
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Conversely, the common ground approach is only vulnerable to 
one of these charges—that of its historically Christian lineage.  For 
Taylor, there is no reason, at the level of theory, why the logic of this 
approach could not be applied and readapted in other non-Christian, 
non-Western contexts.  Of course, such a project would still face 
major difficulties on account of the diversification of religious and 
metaphysical beliefs in increasingly pluralistic societies.  But it is this 
possibility, all the same, that has led contemporary rights theorists to 
seek to define a third approach, one that avoids both the historical 
and conceptual shortcomings of the former two strategies. 
This third and more recent strategy seeks to apply the insights of 
philosophical hermeneutics to Rawl‘s idea of overlapping consensus.  
In asking what it would mean to come to a ―genuine, unforced inter-
national consensus on human rights,‖ Taylor has suggested this 
would require that 
different groups, countries, religious communities, and civiliz-
ations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on 
theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come 
to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human 
behavior.  Each would have its own way of justifying this from 
out of its profound background conception.  We would agree 
on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right 
norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, 
undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief.20 
The strength of this approach is that it avoids the need for 
agreement on a commonly held ―foundation.‖  As we have seen, the 
common ground approach founders in its search for shared religious 
bases for norms regulating the public sphere in a world of diverse 
states and societies.  Once beyond the relatively homogenous dis-
course of Judeo-Christian constitutionalism, even some form of post-
Enlightenment Deism is unlikely to be accepted in societies based on 
Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, or Confucianism (or indeed certain 
nonreligious comprehensive ideologies such as Communism).   
It is for this reason that the independent political ethic appears to 
offer the only viable alternative.  The problem is that universal 
acceptance of any independent ethic—conceived in purely secular, 
 
20. Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in THE 
EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124, 124 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell 
eds., 1999). 
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―political‖ terms—must also involve the acceptance by diverse 
societies of its conceptual foundations.  But as we have seen, from 
any comprehensive perspective such deontological assertions of 
objectivity and universality are likely to be contested as deriving 
from competing, ―secular‖ metaphysical philosophies. 
The hermeneutic approach is able to overcome these various 
difficulties by accepting from the outset the impossibility of any 
universally agreed foundation—whether as a product of religiously-
inspired convergence or deontological deduction—for those prin-
ciples or norms sought to govern the political sphere.  It accepts that 
those who adhere to such a norm ―will have some broader and deeper 
understanding of the good in which it is embedded‖ and it thus aims 
to ―respect the diversity of such understandings, while building 
consensus on the ethic.‖21 
Such a paradigm shift, if genuinely and inclusively pursued, has 
significant implications not only for the scope and content of human 
rights norms but also for their philosophical background justifications 
and the legal forms in which they are expressed and given force.  As 
Taylor states:  
To be accepted in any given society, these would in each case 
have to repose on some widely acknowledged philosophical 
justification, and to be enforced, they would have to find 
expression in legal mechanisms.  One way of putting our 
central question might be this: What variations can we imagine 
in philosophical justifications or in legal forms that would still 
be compatible with a meaningful universal consensus on what 
really matters to us, the enforceable norms?22 
On this basis, Taylor posits a threefold distinction between norms, 
legal forms, and background justifications, and argues that such 
norms have to be ―distinguished and analytically separated not just 
from the background justifications, but also from the legal forms that 
give them force.‖23 
 
21. Taylor, supra note 17, at 38. 
22. Taylor, supra note 20, at 129. 
23. Id. at 143. 
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EQUALITY AND THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE 
Let me turn now to the second puzzle in human rights theory: the 
question of what we mean by ―human equality‖ and how this idea 
relates to deeply-situated issues of collective identity and culture. 
Consider again laws proscribing the wearing of religious symbols 
in certain parts of the public sphere.  Under traditional liberal rights 
approaches, the controversy over the wearing of the Islamic headscarf 
appears inexplicable.  As Anna Galeotti states: 
The naive liberal view conceives of toleration as the principle 
according to which everyone should be free to follow his or 
her ideals and style of life as long as no harm is done to 
anyone else.  Headscarves do no harm to any third party, and 
the choice to wear one for whatever reason rests in the proper 
domain of personal freedom.  This simplistic approach to the 
case suggests that toleration is the obvious solution, but, in 
doing so, it disguises the raison d’être of the controversy.24 
But viewing this issue solely in terms of individual rights (i.e., 
individuals are free to practice their religion provided the practice 
does not cause harm to others) obscures the collective religious and 
cultural implications of symbols such as the Islamic headscarf.  
Members of different national, cultural, and religious groups have 
differing national, cultural, and religious identities—that is to say, 
collective identities—which must be carefully factored into 
interpreting or analyzing rights claims of this kind.  Indeed, what 
gives rise to conflicts between differently-situated subjects are not 
primarily differences between individuals, but differences—and 
unequal treatment—between groups. 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the Universal 
Declaration says very little about so-called ―collective rights.‖  
Emerging from the ashes of the Second World War was a general 
consensus amongst the main powers in the early 1940s to replace the 
minority protection treaties of the inter-war period with a human 
rights regime more directly centered on individual rights.  The 
prevailing sentiment in 1943 was captured by Under Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles, when he stated that: 
in the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to 
 
24. ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI, TOLERATION AS RECOGNITION 118 (2002). 
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exist any need for the use of that accursed term ―racial or 
religious minority‖ . . . [I]s it conceivable that the peoples of 
the United Nations can consent to the reestablishment of any 
system where human beings will still be regarded as belonging 
to such ―minorities‖?25 
Accordingly, neither the U.N. Charter nor the Universal 
Declaration contains any group or minority rights provisions, and 
both are premised instead on the nondiscrimination principle.26  Part 
of the reason for this was the decisive influence of the Western 
powers in drafting the Declaration, especially the United States.  In 
the Third Session of the Human Rights Commission, for example, 
Eleanor Roosevelt argued that ―provisions relating to rights of 
minorities had no place in a declaration of human rights,‖ largely on 
the basis that ―minority questions did not exist on the American 
continent.‖27  It was only later, when the process began of trans-
forming the Declaration into the legally binding International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), that certain collect-
ive rights were (re)introduced into international human rights law.  In 
particular, Article 1, protecting a people‘s right to self-determination, 
and Article 27, protecting the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
minorities, are today accepted international legal norms.  The 
inclusion of self-determination in both covenants,28 coupled with 
Article 27 in the ICCPR, thus reflect recognition of the limitations of 
 
25. Joel E. Oestreich, Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 108, 
113 (1999) (quoting Sumner Welles, Address by the Under Secretary of State (June 5, 1943), 
in 8 DEPT. ST. BULL. 479, 482) (alteration in original). 
26. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A (III), art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), (26), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
27. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Hum. Rts. Comm‘n, 3d Sess., 73d plen. mtg. 
at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.73 (June 24, 1948).  In the previous year, Eleanor Roosevelt 
made the point that while there were different ethnic and linguistic groups in the U.S., their 
rights were adequately secured on the basis of individual rights and the nondiscrimination 
principle.  See also U.N. ECOSOC, Hum. Rts. Comm‘n, Report of the Working Group on 
the Declaration on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/57 (Dec. 10, 1947).  For a striking 
account of this period in American foreign policy, see CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE 
PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
1944–1955 (2003) (pointing to the ―exigencies of the Cold War‖ and the need to camouflage 
the ―the reality of Jim Crow democracy‖ and the ―Colored question‖ as shaping the U.S. 
drafting positions). 
28. The right to self-determination is articulated in Article 1 common to both the ICCPR, 
supra note 26, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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the nondiscrimination principle and the need to protect the rights of 
minority groups and indigenous peoples—not just their physical 
existence but also their right to a distinct collective identity.29 
Scholars of international human rights law are beginning to 
recognize how the divergent claims and interests of majorities and 
minorities, and the different conceptions of individual and collective 
goods from which they arise, are inseparably related to individual 
claims of right.  Correspondingly, it is becoming apparent that the 
―liberal algebra‖30 of rights regimes is unable to resolve such conflicts 
without considering, at least at some point in the analysis, different 
conceptions of collective goods in the historical context of particular 
political communities. 
In order to illustrate the importance of the collective aspects of 
claims to religious freedom, we need to squarely confront a generally 
under-theorized and contested area of international human rights law 
known broadly as ―group rights.‖  In particular, we need to consider 
two types of communal claims—the first of so-called ―peoples‖ or 
―nations,‖ and the second of so-called ―religious, cultural or linguistic 
minorities.‖  
Together these group claims point toward the need for a theory of 
value pluralism in international law (whether ―liberal‖ or otherwise) 
and away from classical liberal theories premised exclusively on the 
 
29. Given these post-1948 developments, Morsink has asked whether an additional 
provision modeled on Article 27 of the ICCPR should be added to the Declaration today.  
MORSINK, supra note 9.  This would, in his view, correct the ―greatest defect of this pivotal 
document,‖ i.e., the blindness it shares with the U.N. Charter about the connection that exists 
between the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities.  See id. at 286–
287.  See also PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 
141–143 (1991) (suggesting that Article 27 is the ―only expression of the right to an identity 
in modern human rights conventions intended for universal application‖). 
30. For Waldron, the liberal algebra of rights seeks to secure public order in a way that is 
fair to the aims and activities of all.  The aim is Kantian in inspiration: ―Act externally in 
such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone 
according to a universal law.‖  Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Reasonableness, in THE 
CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE 13 (Catriona 
McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003).  On this basis 
the liberal claim ―may be described as the task of specifying a set of constraints on 
conduct (call it set C), satisfying two conditions: (1) no two actions permitted by C 
conflict with one another; and (2) for each individual who is subject to C, the range 
of actions permitted by C is adequate for the pursuit of his ends.  I shall call these 
the requirements of compossibility and adequacy.  Together they amount to 
something like algebraic specifications for the formal structure of a liberal society. 
Id. at 14–15. 
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idea of individual rights.  Indeed, it is only by including in the 
analysis these two sets of group rights (self-determination and 
minority rights) and considering their conceptual interrelationship to 
individual rights that the issue of the wearing of religious symbols or 
attire becomes comprehensible, and the need to move beyond 
traditional liberal accounts of human rights becomes apparent.  On 
this basis, the need to accord public recognition of group differences 
and identities requires us to reconsider two central tenets of the 
liberal rights tradition: first, the idea that comprehensive conceptions 
of religious and moral value are ―private‖ matters to be excluded 
from the public sphere; and second, the idea that religious freedom 
requires no more than noninterference with the individual‘s imagined 
sphere of liberty, as opposed to public recognition of a plurality of 
different religious and cultural groups and ways of life. 
Taylor refers to the Western concern for equality in the form of 
nondiscrimination—which he notes is a relatively recent addition to 
the Western philosophical tradition of rights and judicial review—to 
illustrate these points.  This norm can be traced to the rise of the idea 
of Natural Right, its supplanting of subjective rights in medieval 
systems of law, and the decline of the view that human beings are 
embedded in a meaningful cosmic order against which ―various 
forms of human differentiation could appear natural, unchallenge-
able—be they social, racial, or sexual.‖31  Taylor thus argues that: 
The destruction of this order has allowed for a process of 
unmasking existing social and gender differences as merely 
socially constructed, as without basis in the nature of things, as 
revocable and hence ultimately without justification.  The 
process of working this out has been long, and we are not yet 
at the end, but it has been hard to resist in Western civilization 
in the last two centuries.   
  This aspect of Western rights talk is often very hard to 
export because it encounters societies in which certain social 
differences are still considered very meaningful, and they are 
seen in turn as intrinsically linked to certain practices that in 
Western societies are now regarded as discriminatory.32 
What this suggests is not that equality and nondiscrimination 
norms should be rejected under the banner of cultural relativism, but 
 
31. Taylor, supra note 20, at 139.  
32. Id. 
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rather that uniquely Western conceptions of these norms, including 
the extent to which such conceptions have become entrenched in 
international law, need constantly to be open to challenge and 
reformation in such a way as to allow for the contribution of non-
Western conceptions of the same ideas. 
Questions of gender equality raised in cases such as Shah Bano33 in 
India or the issue of recognition of Muslim marriages in South 
Africa,34 for example, give rise to conflicts between contested ideas 
of equality and difference.  The demand of the Muslim community in 
India for an autonomy regime and legal recognition of religious and 
other ―personal‖ laws is a demand against the Indian state for 
substantive equality on the basis of religion or belief.  In Shah Bano, 
a conflict arose between a Muslim personal law requiring the return 
of the marriage settlement upon divorce and the payment of 
maintenance only for the period of iddat, and the Indian Code of 
Criminal Procedure requiring monthly maintenance in specified 
situations of need.  In this case, we face a genuine conflict not 
between a liberty claim on the one hand and an equality claim on the 
other, but between two competing conceptions of equality.  One 
conception of equality protects India‘s Muslim minority against other 
majority and minority groups and the other protects the equal rights 
of women in India regardless of religion.  We should be careful not to 
recognize automatically or privilege only the second substantive 
equality claim and not the first.  And if both claims are to be given 
their due, how are the conflicts between them to be resolved?35 
One possibility is for the State to exercise its overriding legislative 
power, what Robert Cover once called the state‘s ―jurispathic‖ mode 
of coercively suppressing the ―fecundity of the jurisgenerative prin-
ciple‖ through the domination of autonomous communities under a 
unitary law.36  But if so, what principle should the state employ?  
Most human rights proponents will argue that the state ought to 
privilege whatever is best for women according to some conception 
of liberal substantive rights.  But what is this conception of equality 
exactly, and who is to decide both its substantive meaning and its 
scope of application?  Does it entail the version of maintenance upon 
 
33. Mohammed Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India). 
34. See infra, note 40 and accompanying text.  
35. See Danchin, supra note 6, at 58. 
36. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–16 (1983). 
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divorce currently seen as meeting the demands of substantive gender 
equality in, say, France, or Australia, or perhaps Brazil?  Or is it 
rather the latest account advanced by Catherine MacKinnon or 
Abdullahi An-Na‘im?  And how exactly is any such account to be 
squared with the Indian Constitution‘s commitment in Articles 26 
through 28 to guarantee the communal autonomy of India‘s religious 
minorities? 
We may also ask whether the ultimate goal sought under the twin 
banners of ―secularism‖ (or ―equal individual rights‖) and ―gender 
equality‖ is for religious personal law to disappear altogether and to 
be replaced by a uniform civil code.  Recall, for example, Susan 
Moller Okin‘s striking statement in her essay Is Multiculturalism Bad 
for Women?: 
[It] is by no means clear, from a feminist point of view, that 
minority group rights are ‗part of the solution‘ and in the case 
of nonliberal minority groups in liberal states, ―female 
members of the culture . . . might be much better off if the 
culture into which they were born were either to become 
extinct (so that its members would become integrated into the 
less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be 
encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of 
women—at least to the degree to which this value is upheld in 
the majority culture.37 
Is this the possibility of a ―final solution‖ of which Isaiah Berlin 
once spoke—the prospect that mankind could be made just and happy 
and creative and harmonious forever, for which ―no price [could be] 
too high‖ to pay?38  If so, what exactly is the price to be paid, how is 
it to be exacted, and what, if any, are the possible alternatives for the 
future? 
Ironically, in order for the state to be right in its codification of the 
demands of substantive gender equality, it must ignore, or simply 
override, the nuanced and contested internal arguments within 
religious communities themselves.  My argument is that there are 
strong normative reasons why the state ought to exercise considerable 
 
37. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM 
BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Martha C. Nussbaum et al. eds., 1999). 
38. Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: 
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 15 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991), cited in STEVEN LUKES, 
LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSITY 90 (2003). 
11 DANCHIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  12:46 PM 
116 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:99 
deference to the arguments going on there and that the struggle over 
the status quo ought not to be decided solely by the state according to 
what prevailing national majorities (recall the intolerant and 
threatening role of the Hindu Right in the Shah Bano controversy) or 
secular liberal academics, judges or bureaucrats decide. 
Of course, how such claims are to be mediated is essentially 
contested, but requires, at a minimum, an intersubjective and dialogic 
understanding of rights discourse.  A helpful illustration of this 
dynamic is the current debate in South Africa over the recognition of 
Muslim personal laws.39  After extensive consultations with Muslim 
communities, the South African Law Reform Commission proposed, 
in July 2003, a draft Muslim Marriages Act which inter alia 
recognizes Muslim marriages (including polygynous marriages) and 
deals with a myriad of issues from registration, to dissolution, to 
custody of and access to minor children, and to issues of maintenance 
(both spousal and child support).  In response, the South African 
Commission for Gender Equality drafted an alternative bill called the 
Recognition of Religious Marriages Act, which is stated to be a 
―secular bill of general application‖ and provides for the recognition 
of all religious marriages (thus avoiding issues of codification of 
specific religious doctrines).40 
This is precisely the type of conflict which value pluralism both 
anticipates and celebrates.  In South Africa, we can thus see a robust 
constitutional dispensation which provides the normative space for 
contestation between what Ayelet Shachar has termed a ―religious 
particularist‖ conception of pluralism, in which different religious 
 
39. The legal recognition of shari’a law is today becoming a contested issue in a number 
of Western states such as Canada where the Ontario Law Reform Commission is reviewing 
whether Islamic principles of family and inheritance law could be used to resolve disputes 
within the Muslim community in Canada.  See Report from Marion Boyd to Michael Bryant, 
Attorney General of Ontario, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, 
Promoting Inclusion (Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ 
english/about/pubs/boyd (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).  In England, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury has recently observed that Muslim communities seek the freedom to live under 
shari’a law and he has urged an exploration of what ―might be entailed in crafting a just and 
constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom.‖  
Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Civil and Religious Law in England: a 
Religious Perspective, Lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice (Feb. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). 
40. For a recent discussion of the tensions between these two bills, see Rashida Manjoo, 
The Recognition of Muslim Personal Laws in South Africa: Implications for Women’s 
Human Rights (Hum. Rts. Program at Harv. L. Sch, Project Report 2005-7, 2007), available 
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Manjoo_RashidaWP.pdf. 
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communities have legal power over issues of personal status, and a 
―secular absolutist‖ conception, in which the state has authority over 
family law matters and all citizens are subject to a uniform secular 
family law.  That this contestation will yield varying forms of legal 
pluralism and accommodation while at the same time seeking to 
maintain the existence of different majority and minority cultures 
should not surprise us either descriptively or normatively. 
These then are the difficult questions that confront us.  They 
involve normative conflicts which are also far from settled even in 
the West (as Rawls‘s avoidance strategy of consigning questions of 
discrimination on the basis of religion to the ―private sphere‖ in his 
Political Liberalism amply shows).  Thus:  
we can readily understand that a certain way of framing the 
difference, however oppressive it may be in practice, also 
serves as the reference point for deeply felt human identities.  
The rejection of the framework can be felt as the utter denial of 
the basis of identity, and this not just for the favored gender, 
but also for the oppressed one.41 
Claims of equality and nondiscrimination—even in liberal 
societies—raise difficult and complex questions in their relationship 
to religion and culture.  If the plurality of conflicting values is to be 
mutually respected, rather than uncritically dominated by one value, 
conflicts between equality norms and collective identities must be 
interpreted and inter-subjectively discussed in continuity with each 
society‘s historic traditions and reference points.  Indeed, it is now 
well recognized that ―fundamentalist‖ resistance to the redefinition of 
cultural and religious forms correlates with the extent to which 
outside portrayals or attempts to influence a tradition are made in 
condemnatory or contemptuous terms.42 
On this basis, scholars such as Abdullahi An-Na‘im advocate the 
logic of the heremeneutic approach in relation to the application of 
human rights norms in non-Western contexts.  This requires the 
development of a ―coherent and comprehensive methodology of 
internal cultural discourse that is capable of challenging prevailing 
conceptions of indigenous culture in favor of the proposed human 
 
41. Taylor, supra note 20, at 139. 
42. As Taylor observes, this is a ―self-reinforcing dynamic, in which perceived external 
condemnation helps to feed extreme reaction, which calls down further condemnation, and 
hence further reaction, in a vicious spiral.‖  Id. at 140.  
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rights norm.‖43  This can be illustrated by considering the principle of 
equality in the context of the Islamic legal tradition where, from the 
perspective of international human rights law, shari’a law is regarded 
as discriminating against women and non-Muslim minorities.  
Distinctions in shari’a based on certain historical and cultural 
understandings of the natural or divine order of things run up against 
the uncompromising demands of human rights standards for the 
formal equality of all human beings.  Tabandeh, for example, has 
argued that Islam cannot accept certain aspects of Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration (prohibiting discrimination on any ground), 
―for it cannot deny the difference between Muslim and non-
Muslim.‖44  Similarly, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam provides that ―[w]oman is equal to man in human dignity,‖ 
while making no reference to equality in rights.45 
Western scholars of Islam and human rights such as Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer regard such sharia-based distinctions as clear violations of 
international human rights standards.46  But Mayer fails to consider 
on what basis rights such as Article 7 of the Universal Declaration, 
which establishes the principle of formal equality and equal 
protection of the law,47 should properly be regarded as universal.  
 
43. Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im, The Cultural Mediation of Human Rights: The Al-Arqam 
Case in Malasia, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 147, 
156.  An-Na‘im suggests that ―all cultures have a certain degree of ambivalence that allows 
for contesting prevailing perceptions and seeking to replace them with new or formerly 
suppressed conceptions through an internal discourse within the terms of reference of the 
particular culture and in accordance with its own criteria of legitimacy.‖  Id. at 159.  See also 
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 3, 7 (1990) (arguing for acceptance of the 
concept and content of a human rights regime through internal cultural legitimation in an 
Islamic context). 
44. SULTAN HUSSEIN TABANDEH OF GUNABAD, A MUSLIM COMMENTARY ON THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (F. J. Goulding trans., 1970). 
45. 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, July 31–Aug. 5, 1990, Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, art. 6, reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
BASIC DOCUMENTS 185, 186 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998).  See also UDHR, 
supra note 26, art. 1(a) (providing, in part, that ―[a]ll men are equal in terms of basic human 
dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds 
of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other 
considerations‖ (emphasis added)). 
46. ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 83–96 
(3d ed. 1999) (examining Islamic law, especially pertaining to discrimination against women 
and non-Muslim minorities, in terms of international human rights standards). 
47. Art. 7 of the UDHR, supra note 26, provides in full that: ―All are equal before the 
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are 
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
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Indeed, Mayer‘s analysis of Article 7, in terms of the equal protection 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, is 
revealing: 
Although many features of U.S. equal protection jurisprudence 
necessarily reflect the peculiarities of U.S. history and the 
social environment, the basic concept has been emulated in 
other laws, and the idea of equal protection of the law is 
endorsed in international law. . . .  
  One sees in Article 7 of the [Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights] unequivocal endorsement of the idea that 
equal, nondiscriminatory treatment under the law is due all 
persons.  According to Article 2 of the UDHR, it is imper-
missible to discriminate based on sex or religion, race, color, 
language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, or birth or other status.  Any legal measures that 
discriminate among groups of people using these criteria 
violate the UDHR guarantee of equality and equal protection.   
  Thus, both the U.S. constitutional principle and its UDHR 
counterpart envisage equal protection under a neutral law, a 
law that does not deny freedoms or rights to members of 
weaker or disfavored categories of society and that accords all 
people equal treatment.48 
The historical and conceptual linkages between Anglo-American 
and prevailing international conceptions of the nondiscrimination 
norm here are laid bare.  While Mayer acknowledges the particular 
historical context in which the U.S. equal protection clause arose in 
the aftermath of the Civil War and efforts to end apartheid against 
blacks in the South,49 she uncritically accepts its subsequent elevation 
to the status of international law. 
The result of this elision for human rights discourse has had two 
interrelated distorting effects.  On the one hand, to the extent that 
religious and cultural forms are embedded in the (public) laws and 
practices of non-Western states, any attempt to justify these norms 
 
against any incitement to such discrimination.‖ 
48. MAYER, supra note 46, at 88–89 (emphasis added). 
49. Mayer cites Jacobus tenBroek, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1951).  Note that Taylor similarly traces the rise of equal protection and 
nondiscrimination as central subjects of judicial review in the Anglo-American world to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND ―THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION‖ 54–56 (Amy Gutmann et al eds., 1992). 
11 DANCHIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2009  12:46 PM 
120 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:99 
against the international legal norms of equality and nondiscrim-
ination has been axiomatically viewed as constituting a disreputable 
form of cultural relativism justifying patriarchal and pre-modern 
hierarchies and power relations. 
While in many instances this may well be the case, there has been 
a serious failure to understand that the conception of toleration used 
for making such judgments presumes a compromise in the form of an 
historically and culturally particular view of toleration which itself 
remains in force in virtually all liberal states.  This view springs from 
the classic liberal idea of a public-private divide which not so much 
resolves questions of inequality and unequal treatment on religious 
and cultural grounds as avoids or suppresses them.   
In failing to see universal demands of equality and nondis-
crimination in the public sphere as embodying the unconscious 
prejudices of a particular tradition, a ―single, rigid and dogmatic 
horizon of individual freedom,‖50 such an approach forecloses the 
possibility of any fusion of horizons with other conceptions—ones 
that may well contain admirable and valuable insights and other 
forms of accommodation. 
We see this dynamic most obviously in the well-trodden debate 
over claims of equality and diversity in contemporary political 
theory.  For instance, Brian Barry‘s Culture and Equality provides a 
recent example of a liberal theorist clinging rigidly to interpretive 
method with no apparent conception of the prejudices underlying his 
―objective‖ theory of egalitarian liberalism.51  In reply, James Tully 
has argued that there are at least three ways in which Barry‘s 
approach forecloses any genuine dialogue on the ―irreducible and 
interrelated problems of equality and culture,‖ and thus of any 
possible fusion of horizons.52 
First, Barry employs ―Enlightenment blackmail‖ by dismissing any 
opposing arguments as advancing or deriving from anti-Enlighten-
ment essentialist conceptions of culture.  In fact, however, the 
dialogic concept of culture at the heart of philosophical hermeneutics 
 
50. See Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the 
Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. L.J. 249, 321 (2008). 
51. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTI-
CULTURISM (2001). 
52. James Tully, The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry’s Polemical Attack on Multicultur-
alism, in MULTICULTURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURE AND EQUALITY AND ITS CRITICS 102, 
102–13 (Paul Kelly ed., 2002). 
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is quite the reverse: not ―separate, bounded and internally uniform,‖ 
but rather ―overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated.‖53 
Second, Barry seeks to contrast and polarize anti-Enlightenment 
particularism and relativism with Enlightenment universalism and 
non-relativism.  This is achieved in two ways: 
(i) by taking formal equality (sameness of treatment) as the 
standing norm against which any claim for recognition must 
advance compelling reasons to gain an exception rather than 
attempting to ―work out what a liberal commitment to equality 
(of opportunity and respect) means in today‘s conditions of 
cultural diversity;‖ and 
(ii) by mistaking universal rights and their means of recog-
nition and accommodation with the non-universal features 
these rights protect.54   
By contrast, contemporary theorists of difference, such as Will 
Kymlicka and Joseph Carens (who Barry bitterly criticizes), have 
sought to defend notions of community and culture from within the 
liberal tradition itself by advancing accounts of minority rights that 
seek to balance individual autonomy and the limits of toleration in 
multicultural modern societies.55  In similar terms, Rawls‘s shift from 
A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism (also attacked by Barry) is 
a further example of a liberal theorist struggling to deal with the 
implications of religious and cultural diversity in a democratic 
society. 
Finally, Barry ignores the ―democratic dimension‖ of multi-
culturalism whereby citizens exchange (ethical) reasons over claims 
for public recognition and accommodation of suppressed cultural 
differences.56  This is based on a critical distinction between 
 
53. Id. at 104.  Tully‘s argument that these features of cultures allow for their continuous 
renegotiation and transformation by their members is set out more fully in JAMES TULLY, 
STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995). 
54. Tully, supra note 52, at 105–106. 
55. See especially WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); 
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
(1995); THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); see also JOSEPH H. 
CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE 
AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000). 
56. Tully, supra note 52, at 108.  This has four features: (1) the Enlightenment ideal that 
laws should rest on the agreement of the people through the free exchange of public reasons; 
(2) the exchange of reasons over a contested rule of recognition takes place in accordance 
with universal principles of reciprocity; (3) while the ―internal reasons‖ that members of a 
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―internal‖ moral reasons and ―external‖ ethical reasons, the latter—
though drawing on aspects of a person‘s or group‘s particular 
practical identity—being both ―general‖ and ―public.‖  By being 
closed and unwilling to discover and revise the unreflective partiality 
in his own particular interpretation of freedom and equality (which, 
after all, is ―universal and culture-free‖), Barry has no need for any 
modus vivendi ethos of toleration and peaceful coexistence.57 
On the other hand, to the extent that religious traditions themselves 
(independent of any state laws and practices) are the source of 
unequal and discriminatory treatment, the public-private distinction 
has operated in liberal theory—under the banner of ―freedom of 
religion‖—to shield religions in toto from the claims of the equality 
norm.  Scholars of women‘s rights in the areas of culture and religion 
such as Madhavi Sunder have termed this the ―new sovereignty,‖ the 
deference of human rights law to religious despotism in the private 
sphere through the definition of religion as a ―sovereign, extralegal 
jurisdiction in which inequality is not only accepted, but expected.‖  
She states: ―Law views religion as natural, irrational, incontestable, 
and imposed—in contrast to the public sphere, the only viable space 
for freedom and reason.  Simply put, religion is the ―other‖ of 
international law.‖58  In all societies, however, religious communities 
are internally contested, heterogeneous, and constantly evolving 
through internal debate and interaction with outsiders.  In questioning 
the traditional liberal construction of this category, Sunder refers to 
recent attempts by human rights groups (especially in non-Western 
contexts) to construct and realize a ―new enlightenment‖ which seeks 
reason, equality, and liberty not just in the public sphere, but also in  
 
culture give themselves for the importance of their cultural practices may be particular, the 
―external reasons‖ they give to their fellow citizens are general and public; and (4) upholding 
the democratic ideal requires a mutual openness and respect towards the views and claims of 
others in order to discover and revise the unreflective partiality in one‘s own views through 
dialogue.  Id. at 108–110. 
57. As Tully observes, Barry‘s conception of democratic dialogue is so ―constrained by 
the preemptory [sic] universality of his own theory that there is little room to discuss 
diversity under his category of exemptions to general rules.  This monological stance is not 
only wrong in theory; it also leads to the transformation of reasonable disagreement into 
ideological conflict and hence to instability in practice.‖  Id. at 110 (citations omitted). 
58. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2003). 
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the private spheres of religion, culture, and family.59  By failing to 
include such questions within the scope of rights discourse, the law of 
human rights in effect has deferred to the authoritarian claims of 
patriarchal, religious elites thereby buttressing their power vis-à-vis 
the claims of women‘s rights activists. 
Of course, any such claims raise complex and difficult conflicts 
between equality norms on the one hand, and religious and cultural 
freedom norms on the other.  A value pluralist approach to such 
questions opens the possibility of new forms of the hermeneutic 
circle and thus diverse forms of fusion of horizons.  This, in turn, 
opens the way to a less dogmatic and binary account of reason and 
religion by viewing both as human institutions and social practices 
requiring modes of justification and accountability.  Just as is the case 
with the doctrine of substantive neutrality, this requires the constant 
search for forms of accommodation, mutual understanding, and 
overlapping consensus between actual religious communities and the 
normative claims of rights discourse understood in value pluralist and 
philosophically hermeneutic terms.  In order for this to occur, 
however, the primary obstacle, the inability of Western rights 
theorists to see their culture as one amongst others, must be 
surpassed.  As Taylor concludes: 
To an extent, Westerners see their human rights doctrine as 
arising simply out of the falling away of previous counter-
vailing ideas . . . that have now been discredited to leave the 
field free for the preoccupations with human life, freedom, the 
avoidance of suffering.  To this extent they will tend to think 
that the path to convergence requires that others too cast off 
their traditional ideas, that they even reject their religious 
heritage, and become ―unmarked‖ moderns like us.  Only if we 
in the West can recapture a more adequate view of our own 
 
59. Id. at 1403.  Sunder notes that women in many non-Western contexts now challenge 
religious and cultural authorities and seek to re-imagine religious community on more 
egalitarian and democratic terms.  These efforts are different from the women‘s rights 
movement in the West, which offers women a right to religious freedom (on patriarchal, 
religious leaders‘ terms) or a right to equality (within the public sphere and without 
normative community), but not a comprehensive right to both.  Thus, ―[e]nvisioning a third 
way, women human rights activists in Muslim communities are pursuing equality and 
freedom within the context of religion, not just without it.‖  Id. at 1404.  Sunder refers, in 
particular, to the transnational solidarity network ―Women Living Under Muslim Laws.‖  Id. 
at 1433–43.  
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history, can we learn to understand better the spiritual ideas 
that have been interwoven in our development and hence be 
prepared to understand sympathetically the spiritual paths of 
others toward the converging goal.60 
 
 
60. Taylor, supra note 20, at 143–44.  Given the logic of philosophical hermeneutics, any 
overlapping consensus or modus vivendi that may evolve over time will not therefore be 
achieved through a ―loss or denial of traditions all around, but rather by creative 
reimmersions of different groups, each with their own spiritual heritage, traveling different 
routes to the same goal.‖  Id. at 144. 
